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Economic disparities in China: an analysis on the causes of increasing
                inter-county inequality during the reform period 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 During the period of economic reforms, China has experienced enormous growth rates 
year after year, with an average annual GDP growth of around 12% in the period 1978-1996  
(Worldbank, 2010). However, these impressive growth rates have been accompanied by an 
equally impressive increase of economic inequality, with a GINI index increasing from 29.11 
in 1981 to 35.70 in 1996 (Worldbank, 2010), causing the Chinese government to fear for 
social and political instability (Fan & Sun, 2008, p. 1). In order to fully understand this 
problem of increasing inequality, it is important, as noted by Tsui (1993) in his pioneering 
work, to decompose the overall economic inequality into its various components. While much 
has been written about the interprovincial component (e.g. Lu & Wang, 2002; Démurger, 
2001; Vogel, 2013; Ma & Wei, 1997) and the rural-urban component (e.g. Kanbur & Zhang, 
1999; Yang, 1999; Whyte, 2010), much less work is available dealing with the intraprovincial 
component. This is quite notable, as most Chinese provinces are comparable to a good-sized 
country and therefore massive variation exists within these provinces (Lyons, 1998, p. 406). 
Furthermore, while interprovincial and rural-urban inequality recently have declined, 
intraprovincial inequality has increased steadily and constitutes, according to Cheong & Wu 
(2012, p. 200), the crux of the problem of regional inequality in China, a conclusion that has 
also been drawn by Hussain, Lanjouw and Stern (1994), and Akita (2003), who found that the 
intraprovincial component accounted for 64 percent of the overall regional economic 
inequality in China in the year 1997. The scarce availability of literature dealing with the 
intraprovincial component of economic inequality in China can therefore be considered a gap 
in the literature, as noted by Wei and Fan (2000, p. 457).      
 This thesis will try to narrow this gap by analysing one specific component of 
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intraprovincial inequality: the inequality between counties. While counties are frequently 
small, they are usually still large enough to potentially possess important forms of 
differentiation (Blecher & Shue, 1996, p. 5), that will make it possible to assess the 
importance of various factors, such as for example geography, economy or history, in the 
increase of intraprovincial inequality. More specifically, to identify the causes behind the 
increase in intraprovincial inequality during the period of economic reforms, I will try to give 
an answer to the following research question: why have counties in China’s coastal provinces 
experienced such remarkably different levels of economic growth during the period of 
economic reforms, resulting in a rapid increase of intraprovincial economic inequality? While 
most scholars agree on the fact that inter-county inequality has increased during the reform 
period, they have not yet reached a consensus about the causes of this increase. Some scholars 
(e.g. Wei & Kim, 2002) believe proximity to large cities to be positively related to economic 
growth, while some believe level of FDI (e.g. Wei & Fan, 2000; Long & Ng; Wei, Yu & 
Chen, 2010) or level of state investment (e.g. Long & Ng, 2001) to be one of the most 
important causes of diverging growth rates of counties. However, based on an analysis of 
inter-county inequality in three coastal provinces, I will argue that the institutional factor 
(which emphasizes the dominant economic ownership structure of a county; i.e. whether a 
county’s economy is dominated by state owned enterprises – SOEs – , or by non-state 
enterprises [defined as privately owned enterprises, foreign funded enterprises and Township 
and Village Enterprises – TVEs - ]) is the factor that explains best the increase of inter-county 
inequality during the reform period. I will argue that other variables are either a consequence 
of this institutional variable (like amount of FDI or level of state investment), because 
investment tended to take place in counties with a large non-state sector, or conditional on the 
institutional variable (like proximity to large cities), because the analysis will prove that 
proximity to large cities is only positively related to growth if a county has a large non-state 
sector.            
 This argument will proceed in two parts. In the first part an overview of the existing 
literature about interprovincial and intraprovincial inequality will be presented, with specific 
attention to case studies about the three coastal provinces that are the object of analysis in this 
thesis. This part will furthermore define some key concepts and present the hypothesis, which 
is that counties with a large share of SOEs in total fixed asset investments have had 
significantly lower per capita GDP growth rates (or per capita growth rates of gross value 
industrial and agricultural output where there is no GDP data available) during the reform 
period than counties with a large share of non-state enterprises in total fixed asset investments, 
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because counties with a large share of non-state enterprises were more attractive locations for 
foreign direct investment and received preferential policies from the central government, and 
because SOEs were less efficient and less able to adapt to the new market economy than non-
state enterprises.  The second part will be concerned with two tasks: the justification of my 
methodology (a cross-county comparison of counties within three coastal provinces - Jiangsu, 
Zhejiang and Fujian -  during the period of economic reforms [1978 – 1996] ), and the 
application of the hypothesis to the cases of Jiangsu, Zhejiang and Fujian, to see to what 
extent the institutional variable explains rising inter-county inequality during the reform 
period.  
 
 
Theoretical Framework 
 
 The purpose of this section is to investigate what is known about the causes of 
increasing economic inequality in China during the period of economic reforms, with the 
emphasis on intraprovincial inequality and case studies about Jiangsu, Fujian and Zhejiang. In 
line with the divide drawn by most historians writing about twentieth century Chinese history 
(e.g. Vogel, 2013; Mitter, 2008; van Oudheusden, 2012),  the literature about economic 
inequality in China can be divided in two categories: works dealing with the period before the 
start of economic reforms in 1978 and works dealing with the period after that year. Works 
dealing with economic inequality in the period before 1978 are scarce, because of a lack of 
reliable data. The only work I have found to be relevant to this thesis has been the pioneering 
article of Tsui (1993), whose way of decomposing economic inequality into five different 
components (of which the main three are interprovincial, intraprovincial and rural-urban), has 
become the standard in the literature about economic inequality in China. Consistent with the 
standard set by Tsui (1993), works dealing with the period after the start of economic reforms 
can be divided into three main categories: works about interprovincial inequality, works about 
rural-urban inequality, and works about intraprovincial inequality. Before moving on to 
reviewing the literature about intraprovincial inequality, a comprised overview of the 
literature about interprovincial inequality will be given, because some of the causes identified 
by scholars writing about a topic related to this category are helpful in shedding light on the 
causes of rising intraprovincial inequality as well, as mentioned by Ye and Wei (2005, p. 344). 
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The literature has reached a consensus on the causes of persisting rural-urban inequality, such 
as the hukou-system (Chan, 2009; Cai, Wang & Du, 2002), and because these causes are 
specific to rural-urban inequality and rural-urban inequality does not significantly contribute 
to intraprovincial inter-county inequality (Wei & Fan, 2000; Lyons, 1998, Ye & Wei, 2005), 
the literature on rural-urban inequality will be omitted from this section. Before moving on, 
however, to the literature review, I will first define some key concepts and I will present the 
hypothesis. 
 
Concepts 
 
As the meaning of some concepts can be ambiguous, it is important to define some 
key concepts. The definitions that are used here are consistent with the ones used in most of 
the literature. Non-state enterprises include private enterprises, foreign funded enterprises and 
township and village enterprises. The latter are usually owned by the inhabitants of a certain 
village, but are not controlled by the central government. The period of analysis will be the 
period of economic reforms, here defined as the years  1978 - 1996. Although it can be argued 
that the period of reforms lasts longer, with for example China’s entry into the WTO in 2001, 
the period of 1978-1996 includes the most important reforms, such as the establishment of the 
Special Economic Zones, Deng Xiaoping’s Four Modernizations, Open Door policy and 
Southern Tour, and the contracting down of agricultural production to the household (Vogel, 
2013, pp. 377-664). More generally, in this period China transformed from a stagnant socialist 
economy into a vibrant market economy. Furthermore, while intraprovincial inequality did 
not increase much during the period of Mao, after 1978 it started to increase rapidly in most 
provinces (e.g. Lyons, 1998; Wei & Ye, 2004, Wei & Fan, 2000), which justifies the focus on 
this period in order to identify the causes of intraprovincial inequality in China. Economic 
inequality between counties is defined as either differences in per capita GDP, or (where GDP 
data are not available) as differences in per capita gross value of industrial and agricultural 
output, which is widely considered to be an effective measure of level of economic 
development (Wei & Kim, 2002, p. 145). 
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Hypothesis 
 
As mentioned, the focus will be on inter-county inequality, defined as either 
differences in GDP per capita growth, or (when statistics about GDP are not available) 
differences in per capita growth of industrial and agricultural output, between counties in the 
period of 1978-1996. The hypothesis is that counties with a large state sector (a large share of 
SOEs in total fixed asset investments) have had significantly lower growth rates during the 
reform period than counties with a large non-state sector (a large share of non-state 
enterprises, which include privately owned enterprises, foreign funded enterprises, and TVEs, 
in total fixed asset investments). The expectation that a high share of SOEs is negatively 
related to economic growth is based on three reasons: SOEs were significantly less efficient 
than non-state enterprises, non-state enterprises were better able to adapt to new market 
conditions, and counties with a larger non-state sector received preferential state policies and 
more foreign investment. First of all, SOEs were much less efficient than non-state enterprises: 
in 1996 around 50% of all SOEs made losses (Perotti, Sun & Zou, 1999, p. 152), partly 
caused by the heavy social responsibilities assigned to them, such as pension payments 
(Perotti, Sun & Zou, 1999, pp. 153-154; Vogel, 2013, p. 447). Furthermore, the average 
utilization ratio of capacity of a lot of state industries is very low, with for example the 
automobile industry having a percentage of less than 50 (Perotti, Sun & Zou, 1999, p. 157). In 
contrast, the efficiency of non-state enterprises is much better: in the case of Fujian the labour 
productivity of SOEs in yuan per person was 17,844 in 1990, while that of non-state 
enterprises was 51,318 (Ash & Qi, 1996, pp. 134-135).     
 Furthermore,  non-state enterprises have done much better in adapting to the new 
market economy than have SOEs. While inefficient TVEs have been closed down or taken 
over by other TVEs, loss-making SOEs have continuously been saved by the central 
government (Perotti, Sun & Zou, 1999, p. 160). Furthermore, TVEs, unlike SOEs, had the 
flexibility to adapt to consumer demand and produce the goods they wanted and sell them 
wherever they wanted (Vogel, 2013, p. 446), whereas most SOEs, which have proven to be 
hard to reform (Perotti, Sun & Zou, 1999, pp. 163-167), still operated under the old socialist 
system of planning and produced goods that were either not wanted by consumers or goods 
that were not competitive at the domestic or international marketplace (Ma & Wei, 1997, p. 
223). Another problem is the tight control exercised by the Communist Party over the SOEs, 
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most notably the appointment of managers, which usually resulted in the most qualified 
people not being chosen (Girma & Gong, 2008, p. 740).     
 The final reason is the fact that counties with a lot of non-state enterprises have 
received preferential policies from the central government and a lot of FDI. In 1995 SOEs 
produced only 44% of GDP, but they contributed 71% of national fiscal revenue (Perotti, Sun 
& Zou, p. 155), while the non-state sector received a lot of benefits like tax exemptions and 
state investment, because the chances of success and repayment of investments are higher in 
areas with a large non-state sector (Cannon, 1990, p. 44). Furthermore, counties with a lot of 
non-state enterprises were attractive places for foreign investment, because of preferential 
policies provided by the central government like tax exemptions, currency conversion, 
remission of profit, and convenient approval procedures for investment projects (Perotti, Sun 
& Zou, 1999, p. 161). The influx of FDI provided these counties with much needed foreign 
capital, advanced technology, management skills, and overseas marketing networks (Vogel, 
2013, p. 446; Perotti, Sun & Zou, 1999, p. 161).      
 Therefore, the expectation is that counties with a large share of non-state enterprises 
have had higher growth rates during the reform period than counties with a large share of 
SOEs, and that this resulted from the fact that SOEs were less efficient than non-state 
enterprises and worse in adapting to new market conditions, and from the fact that counties 
with a larger non-state sector have received preferential policies from the central government 
and have received more FDI. This expectation is consistent with literature about transition 
economies in general, which has shown the inefficiency of state enterprises in the new market 
economy (e.g. Gao, 2004; McMillan & Naughton, 1992; Sachs & Woo, 1994), the tendency 
of FDI to concentrate in areas with a marketized environment and its positive effects on those 
areas (e.g. Campos & Kinoshita, 2003; Bevan & Estrin, 2004; Baniak, Cukrowski & 
Herczynski, 2005; Sohinger, 2005; Tian, Lin & Lo, 2004), and the tendency of central 
governments to focus investment in those same areas (e.g. Ma & Wei, 1997; Hellman, Jones 
& Kaufmann, 2003; Bilsen & Konings, 1998).  
 
Literature on interprovincial inequality 
 
As noted by Wei & Fan  (2000, p. 456), most of the literature about economic 
inequality in China has been concerned with the increase of interprovincial inequality. Under 
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Deng Xiaoping’s policy of ‘getting some regions rich first’, the gap between the coastal and 
inland provinces widened significantly during the reform period: while in 1978 the per capita 
GDP of the inland provinces of Qinghai, Tibet, Ningxia and Gansu was higher than that of 
most coastal provinces (excluding the cities with province-level status Beijing, Shanghai and 
Tianjin), in 1990 all of the coastal provinces had higher per capita GDP than the inland 
provinces, a gap that increased even more in the years 1990-1996 (Lu & Wang, 2002, p. 62). 
Scholars have reached more or less a consensus about the causes of this widening economic 
gap between the coastal and the inland provinces, with the following two pairs of factors often 
mentioned: the establishment of the Special Economic Zones and reception of FDI (e.g. 
Mayer, 2010, p. 49; Vogel, 2013, pp. 394-422; Lu & Wang, 2002, p. 43), or state investment 
and infrastructure (e.g. Démurger, 2001; Ma & Wei, 1997).     
 However, more important for the topic of this thesis are works that have found the 
institutional factor  to be significant in explaining rising interprovincial inequality. This factor 
is mentioned by Lu & Wang (2002, p. 60), who argue that the coastal provinces had higher 
levels of economic growth than the inland provinces because TVEs were much more 
developed in the coastal provinces than in the rest of China. Naughton (1988) makes a similar 
argument, in that he blames the lagging economic growth of the western provinces to the 
legacy of the Third Front program, which placed a lot of state-owned heavy industry in the 
western provinces, industry that proved to be inefficient during the reform period. This 
explanation is also given by Ma & Wei (1997, p. 223), who mention that the SOEs in the 
inland regions have been operating at a loss since the start of economic reforms, because their 
products are either not needed or not competitive at both the domestic and international 
marketplace, and by Vogel (2013, pp. 445-447), who argues that TVEs were better  able to 
adapt to market conditions than were SOEs. A similar conclusion is drawn by Yu and Wei 
(2003), who analyse regional inequality in the period 1978-2000 in all Chinese provinces, and 
have found the share of SOEs  being the most important variable explaining per capita GDP 
growth, with a higher share of SOEs in a region’s fixed asset investments negatively related to 
per capita GDP growth, a finding confirmed by Li & Wei (2009). Last but not least, Girma & 
Gong (2008) have investigated the exact amount of SOEs in every province in 1999. They 
have found that nearly all of the coastal provinces (except Hainan) had a lower share of SOEs 
in total output than the interior provinces, confirming the expected negative relation between 
share of SOEs and per capita GDP growth.   
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Literature on intraprovincial inequality 
  
 As mentioned before, intraprovincial inequality forms the crux of the problem of 
regional inequality in China. Just like overall economic inequality in China, intraprovincial 
inequality can also be decomposed into its various components (rural-urban, inter-city and 
inter-county). As this thesis is concerned with inter-county inequality, in this section I will 
review only literature about inter-county inequality, omitting (the scarcely available) works 
that try to identify the causes of rural-urban and inter-city inequality. The literature about 
inter-county inequality can be divided into two categories: works focussing on multiple 
provinces, and works focussing on a single province.     
 Literature about inter-county inequality in multiple provinces is scarce, probably 
because most provinces have published no or only unreliable data about economic inequality. 
The works available either only present data about intraprovincial inequality without trying to 
identify the causes (Gustafsson & Shi, 2002; Cheong, 2013; Cheong & Wu, 2012; Akita, 
2003; Tsui, 1993; Hussain, Lanjouw & Stern, 1994) or are related to the impact of the fiscal 
decentralization measures of the early 1990s, such as the article of Liu, Vasquez and Wu 
(2017), who have examined the impact of fiscal decentralisation measures on intraprovincial 
inequality in 26 provinces. Although their analysis is focused on the period 1995-2009, they 
have conducted their analysis on the county-level, which means that their findings may still 
prove to be helpful in identifying the causes of inter-county inequality during the reform 
period. The authors have found that fiscal decentralization is positively associated with 
intraprovincial inequality, and, of greater significance for the topic of this thesis, that the share 
of SOEs output in the total industrial output is negatively related to economic growth. 
Although the authors do not go into further detail about this finding, it may be possible that 
the SOE-factor has caused divergent development of counties within provinces, while 
measures of fiscal decentralization have amplified the disparities. This hypothesis would be 
consistent with other literature about fiscal decentralization measures in China, such as the 
article of Long & Ng (2001), who argue that fiscal decentralization measures have worsened 
(not caused) intraprovincial inequality, because the weak legal framework caused an almost 
complete absence of redistribution between counties, a conclusion that is also drawn by 
Kanbur & Zhang (2005).         
 Most of the case studies conducted about intraprovincial inequality have focussed on  
Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, or Guangdong, due to issues related to data availability and 
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reliability. As mentioned, my analysis will focus on the inequality within the first three 
provinces, and not Guangdong, as its proximity to Hong Kong (through which enormous 
amounts of FDI and foreign technology entered China) makes it a unique case: the literature 
has reached more or less a consensus that most intraprovincial inequality is caused by the 
uneven growth between the Zhujiang Delta, which has outgrown other areas in the province 
due to its proximity to Hongkong, and the rest of the province (Gu, Shen, Wong and Zhen, 
2001; Liao & Wei, 2012; Lu & Wei, 2007; Shen, Wong, Chu and Feng, 2000). Therefore, this 
section will only review case studies about the first three provinces, starting with Jiangsu 
before moving on to Zhejiang and finally Fujian.      
     
 
Literature on inequality in Jiangsu 
 
 
Four case studies are available about inter-county inequality during the reform period 
in Jiangsu: Wei and Fan (2000), who analyse the years 1985-1995, Wei and Kim (2002), who 
include in their analysis not only the years of economic reforms but also the years under Mao, 
Long and Ng (2001), who investigate the entire reform period from 1978 until 1997, and Wei, 
Yu and Chen (2010), who compare the year 1996 with 2007, but include an analysis of the 
reform period in explaining the inter-county inequality in the year 1996. All four case studies 
agree that inter-county inequality between the counties in the traditionally rich southern 
region of Sunan and the counties in the traditionally poor northern region of Subei has 
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increased during the reform period and especially between the years 1984 and 1995. However, 
the case studies differ in the importance they assign to the various causes of this increase. The 
only independent variable that is found significant by all authors in explaining diverging 
economic growth rates (measured by changes in GNP per capita) of counties, is the share of 
SOEs in a county’s fixed asset investments, with having a large share of SOEs negatively 
affecting economic growth. Wei and Fan (2000, p. 460) explain this relationship by pointing 
to the inefficiency of SOEs and the preferential treatment from the central government 
received by the non-state sector, an explanation that is also given by Wei and Kim (2000, p. 
151), who add that counties with a large non-state sector have received more FDI than 
counties with a large share of SOEs. Long and Ng (2001, p. 229) point out that SOEs are less 
productive than non-state enterprises, while Wei, Yu and Chen (2010, p. 421) confine 
themselves to showing that counties with a large share of SOEs had a significantly lower GDP 
per capita than counties with a large share of non-state enterprises.     
 Besides the institutional factor, two other variables are mentioned in a majority (three) 
of the case studies: level of FDI (Wei & Fan, 2000; Wei & Kim, 2002; Wei, Yu & Chen, 2010) 
and level of state investment (Wei & Fan, 2000; Long & Ng, 2001; Wei, Yu & Chen, 2010), 
with both variables positively affecting economic growth. The finding that higher levels of 
FDI are correlated with higher levels of economic growth is in itself not surprising, because 
counties with a lot of FDI were able to quickly translate this into income and employment, 
which in turn attracts new workers, domestic investment and stimulates local economic 
growth (Wei & Fan, 2000, p. 461). However, as mentioned by Wei and Kim (2002, p. 152) 
and Wei and Fan (2000, p. 462), foreign investors are interested in counties with locational 
advantages, such as good infrastructure and a large non-state sector, which means that level of 
FDI is not really an independent variable, but rather a consequence of the earlier mentioned 
institutional variable share of SOEs. The same applies to level of state investment, as the 
Chinese government was more likely to invest in and give preferential treatment to counties 
with a large non-state sector (Wei & Fan, 2000, p. 460).      
 Other variables mentioned in the case studies explaining different growth rates 
between counties are the difference between counties and cities (Wei & Fan, 2000), proximity 
to large cities (Wei & Kim, 2002), human capital (Wei & Kim, 2002), and fiscal 
decentralization (Long & Ng, 2001). Wei and Fan (2000) have found that counties tended to 
grow faster than cities during the reform period, but this city/county variable is, as they 
explain themselves (pp. 464-466) not really an independent variable, but rather a confirmation 
of the institutional variable share of SOEs, because a lot of SOEs were placed in the cities 
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under Mao’s industrialization policies. In the same way is the fiscal decentralization variable 
not really an independent variable, but rather an explanation for the absence of redistribution 
between rich and poor counties (Long & Ng, 2001, p. 228). Finally, while it is not strange to 
find a positive relationship between the two variables ‘human capital’ and ‘proximity to large 
cities’ and economic growth, the way these variables are operationalized by Wei and Kim 
(2002, p. 158) is quite dubious. They take industrial potential index as a proxy for proximity 
to large cities, but considering the fact that during the Three Front program a lot of heavy 
industry was relocated to interior areas that were not necessarily cities (Naughton, 1988), the 
industrial potential index is not a reliable proxy for proximity to large cities. In the same way 
is their definition of human capital quite strange, as the authors take the number of technical 
workers per 1000 people as a surrogate variable for human capital of a particular county. 
However, they do not specify the meaning of ‘technical workers’ (the definition of technical, 
whether they are Chinese or foreign), so it remains unclear whether human capital is an 
independent variable or rather a dependent variable, influenced by other variables such as the 
presence of foreign companies.         
 To conclude, the only independent variable that appears in all case studies is the 
institutional variable share of SOEs, which negatively influences economic growth and is 
found by all authors to be an important explanation for the increasing inter-county inequality 
during the reform period. The other independent variables mentioned are either a consequence 
of the institutional variable (level of FDI and level of state investment), a proxy for the 
institutional variable (the county/city variable), an amplifier of the institutional variable 
(measures of fiscal decentralization), or operationalized in a dubious way (proximity to large 
cities and human capital).          
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Literature on inequality in Zhejiang 
 
 
Concerning the literature about Zhejiang, three case studies deal with inter-county 
inequality during the reform period: Wei and Ye (2004), Ye and Wei (2005), and Yue, Zhang, 
Ye, Cheng and Leipnik (2014). All authors agree that during the reform period inter-county 
inequality has increased, but that, in contrast to Jiangsu, the spatial distribution of this 
inequality has changed: while in 1978 the traditional gap between the rich counties in the 
northeast and the poor counties in the southwest was still visible, in 1996 another divide had 
appeared: a cluster of rich counties in the east and a cluster of poor counties in the interior 
part of the province. Quite interestingly is the fact that, again in contrast to the case of Jiangsu, 
all case studies seem to agree on the causes of the increase and spatial change of inter-county 
inequality. The institutional variable (having a large share of SOEs in the total amount of 
fixed asset investments) is mentioned as the primary reason of diverging growth rates between 
counties in the reform period in all three cases studies, with counties with a large share of 
SOEs having lower growth rates than counties with a large share of non-state enterprises. Yue 
et al. (2014) also mention the role of FDI, but as argued before, it is more likely that the level 
of FDI is a result of the institutional variable, instead of being an independent variable on its 
own. Wei and Ye (2004, p. 54) mention the positive relation between infrastructure 
availability and GDP per capita growth, but do not go into further detail on this, so it remains 
unclear whether the infrastructure they talk about was already there when the reforms started 
in 1978, or whether it was placed there during the reform period (in which case the 
infrastructure variable may be a consequence of another variable, such as the institutional 
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one). Wei and Ye (2004, p. 56) further argue that proximity to large cities, such as Shanghai, 
is not correlated to higher levels of economic growth, because the counties that are located 
closest to Shanghai were also the counties with high shares of SOEs. This proves the earlier 
mentioned suspicion concerning the finding of Wei and Kim (2002), who argued in the case 
of Jiangsu that there existed a positive relationship between proximity to large cities and 
economic growth of counties, to be right, as proximity to large cities is not an independent 
variable, but only an amplifier positively affecting economic growth if that particular county 
has a small share of SOEs. In other words, proximity to large cities only positively affects 
economic growth of a county when that county has a large share of non-state enterprises.  
        
Literature on inequality in Fujian 
 
 
Of the three provinces, Fujian is the one least investigated, with one article (Lyons, 
1998) and one book chapter (Lyons, 2000) dealing with inter-county inequality during the 
reform period. Lyons (2000) provides for a descriptive analysis of the evolution of inter-
county inequality during the reform period, while Lyons (1998) tries to identify the causes of 
the increasing inter-county inequality and its changing spatial distribution. Lyons (2000) 
comes to the conclusion that inter-county inequality has increased significantly in the period 
1978-1996. Furthermore, while in 1978 the poorest counties were located in the east and the 
richest in the west, in 1996 this had been completely reversed: almost all of the eastern 
counties were among the richest of the province, while most of the western ones belonged to 
the poorest. Lyons (1998) has identified several causes for the increasing inter-county 
inequality and its changing spatial distribution during the reform period. He analyses the role 
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played by infrastructure, the intraprovincial three fronts campaign, and proximity to large 
cities. According to Lyons, presence of infrastructure is positively related to economic growth. 
However, while Lyons does not elaborate on this argument, Ash and Qi (1996, p. 131) note 
that most infrastructural projects in Fujian, funded either by the central government or by 
foreign investors, were undertaken during the reform period, and only in areas specifically 
designated by the central government. As noted before, most state and foreign investment 
took place in counties where the non-state sector was the dominating sector of the economy, 
so infrastructure is a consequence of the institutional variable, instead of being an independent 
variable. He does not elaborate further on the intraprovincial Three Fronts program factor, but 
it is likely that, just as with the national Three Fronts program (Naughton, 1988), the program 
first benefited the development of the western interior counties by the placement of heavy 
industries, but that during the reform period these heavy industries (almost all of which SOEs) 
became uncompetitive. Finally, Lyons has found that proximity to large cities is not 
associated with higher growth levels, a conclusion consistent with findings in the cases of 
Jiangsu and Zhejiang.  
 
Methodology 
 
In order to give an answer to the research question, I will analyse inter-county 
inequality during the reform period in three provinces: Jiangsu, Zhejiang and Fujian. The 
rationale behind the focus on these three provinces is twofold. The first reason is the fact that 
these three provinces have excellent availability of data on the county-level, data that is 
missing or unreliable in most of the provinces outside of the coastal zone and some of the 
provinces in the coastal zone (Shandong, Hebei and Hainan). The second reason is of a 
methodological nature: in order to identify and isolate the factors that have caused a rise of 
inter-county inequality, I have tried to choose provinces that are similar in a lot of aspects, but 
differ in one important aspect. Jiangsu, Zhejiang and Fujian are similar in that all three coastal 
provinces had similar levels of GDP per capita and similar levels of economic growth during 
the reform period (Lu & Wang, 2002, p. 62), had similar infrastructure availability, with only 
the density of waterways diverging (Démurger, 2000, p. 101), and have received more or less 
the same treatment from the central government during the period of economic reforms 
(Vogel, 2013, pp. 394-450). The most important difference between the provinces is, as I have 
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showed in the literature review and I will elaborate on in further detail later, the pattern of 
inequality during the reform period: while in Jiangsu the traditional divide between Subei and 
Sunan has persisted, a new coastal-interior divide has emerged in Zhejiang besides the 
traditional divide, while in Fujian the traditional divide of a rich coast and a poor west has 
been completely reversed. As will be showed later, these different patterns of inequality are 
related to the institutional variable.     
 
 
Analysis 
 
In this section I will analyse inter-county inequality during the reform period in 
Jiangsu, Zhejiang and Fujian. The first subsection will investigate the relationship between 
the institutional variable and diverging economic growth rates of counties, while the second 
subsection will be concerned with addressing alternative explanations that are mentioned in 
the literature (see theoretical framework).  
 
Institutional variable 
 
In all three provinces, counties with a large share of SOEs have had lower per capita 
GDP growth than counties with a large share of non-state enterprises. The following figures 
respectively show the average annual growth of per capita GVIAO in the years 1978-1995 for 
the province of Jiangsu, and the location of SOEs in the province in 1996 : 
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 (Wei & Kim, 2002, p. 153) 
 
 (Wei, Yu & Chen, 2010, p. 421) 
 
These figures show that counties in the middle region of Suzhong and the northern 
region of Subei are more dependent on SOEs than counties in the southern region of Sunan 
and that most counties with a large share of SOEs have had lower economic growth rates than 
counties with a low share of SOEs. The same tendency is visible in Zhejiang and Jiangsu. In 
Zhejiang, in 1978 a significant coastal-interior divide was already visible, but this time with 
the interior counties being more developed than the coastal counties, due to Mao’s 
industrialisation and defence policies (Wei & Ye, 2004, p. 49). Fearing a Taiwanese invasion, 
most heavy and defence industry was located in interior counties, which received quite some 
investment from the central government, while the coastal counties were neglected (Foster, 
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1998, p. 70). However, the preferential policies during Mao’s time received by the interior 
counties resulted in a concentration of SOEs in those counties, while the coastal counties 
relied more on non-state enterprises (Wei & Ye, 2005, pp. 52-54). Not surprisingly, during the 
reform period, on average the coastal counties have had higher growth rates of per capita 
GDP than the interior counties, as shown by the following figure that depicts the changing 
location quotient based on per capita GDP for the period 1978-1998: 
 (Wei & Ye, 2004, p. 55) 
It can be seen that counties which received preferential treatment during Mao’s time (and 
ended up with a large share of SOEs as a result) have lagged behind counties which were 
neglected during Mao’s time. Counties in the South-eastern region of Wenzhou, where the 
non-state sector has been the largest of all regions in Zhejiang (Liu, 1992; Ye & Wei, 2005), 
belong to the fastest-growing counties, while counties in the Western region of Quzhou 
(which were favoured most during Mao’s time) belong to the slowest-growing counties.  
  In Fujian, the province located closest to Taiwan, the spatial pattern visible at 
the beginning of the reform period was mostly a result of policies implemented during Mao’s 
time. Coastal counties and cities, like Xiamen and Quanzhou, received little state investment 
because they were vulnerable in case of a Taiwanese attack (Lyons, 1998, p. 411). However, 
similar to the case of Zhejiang, these neglected counties were the fastest-growing of the 
province during the reform period, as shown by the following figures, which depict annual 
GVIAO growth (the only indicator available for counties in Fujian prior to 1984) between 
1978 and 1984, and per capita GDP growth between 1984 and 1994 : 
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(Lyons, 1998, p. 415) 
Coastal counties, where the non-state sector was most developed, have outgrown interior 
counties, that had large burdens of SOEs (Lyons, 1998, p. 422). To conclude, in all three 
provinces, counties with a large share of SOEs have generally had lower economic growth 
rates during the reform period than counties with a large share of non-state enterprises. As 
mentioned in the hypothesis, there exist three explanations for this finding: 
 
Mechanism 1: Foreign Direct Investment 
The first reason counties with a large non-state sector have outgrown counties with a 
large share of SOEs is that counties with a lot of non-state enterprises have received more FDI. 
These counties were attractive places for foreign investment, because of preferential policies 
provided by the central government like tax exemptions, currency conversion, remission of 
profit, and convenient approval procedures for investment projects (Perotti, Sun & Zou, 1999, 
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p. 161). The following figure shows the location of FDI in Jiangsu in 1996: 
  (Source: Wei & Fan, 2000, p. 462) 
If one compares this figure with the figure about the location of SOEs in Jiangsu, it can be 
seen that FDI tended to concentrate in counties with a small share of SOEs. The same 
tendency is visible in Zhejiang, where counties with a large non-state sector have received 
more FDI (Wei & Ye, 2004, p. 56), with for example in the Northeast the region of Ningbo 
receiving 3.5 times as much FDI as the region of Jiaxing in 1995, and in the Southwest the 
region of Wenzhou receiving almost 9 times as much FDI as the region of Lishui (Foster, 
1998, p. 145). In Fujian, FDI tended to concentrate in counties with a small share of SOEs, as 
mentioned by Lyons (1998, p. 424), but also in areas that were the home soil of many 
emigrated Chinese (Ash & Qi, 1996, pp. 123-152).        
 In all three provinces, counties with a large non-state sector have on average received 
more FDI than counties with a large share of SOEs. The positive effects of FDI on economic 
growth have been extensively covered in the literature, both in relation to the case of China as 
well as in relation to transition economies. In general, foreign participation in domestic firms 
during the economic transition phase has the benefit of bringing strategic restructuring (e.g. 
updating the equipment and the production process) to these firms, which results in a higher 
competitiveness in the new market economy (Konings, 2000, p. 621). Furthermore, because 
of strong profit motives and international market connections, productive units financed by 
FDI tend to improve their productivity and enjoy more rapid growth than SOEs (Wei & Kim, 
2002, p. 158). In the case of China, the influx of FDI in counties with a large non-state sector 
provided these counties with much needed foreign capital, advanced technology, management 
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skills, and overseas marketing networks (Vogel, 2013, p. 446; Perotti, Sun & Zou, 1999, p. 
161).  
 
Mechanism 2: State policies and investment 
The second reason that counties with a large non-state sector have performed better 
economically than counties with a large state-sector is that the Chinese central government 
has invested more in, and given preferential policies to, counties with a large share of non-
state enterprises. In 1995 SOEs produced only 44% of GDP, but they contributed 71% of 
national fiscal revenue (Perotti, Sun & Zou, p. 155), while the non-state sector received a lot 
of benefits like tax exemptions and state investment, because the chances of success and 
repayment of investments are higher in areas with a large non-state sector (Cannon, 1990, p. 
44). In Jiangsu, the central government has indeed given preferential policies, such as low tax 
rates, budget bonuses and new labour policies, to counties located in Sunan, as noted by Wei 
& Fan (2000, pp. 459-460). Furthermore, the central government designated certain zones 
(usually only comprising counties with a large non-state sector) to be opened up, which meant 
they enjoyed tax reliefs and tariff reduction on imports, in order to attract more FDI (Wei & 
Fan, 2000, p. 460). In Zhejiang, counties with a large non-state sector received preferential 
policies from the central government (Liu, 1992, p. 300; Foster, 1998, p. 119), such as 
preferential tax and profit retention rates (Wei & Ye, 2004, p. 55), while in Fujian counties 
with a large non-state sector have benefited from the establishment of several Special 
Economic Zones (Vogel, 2013, pp. 394-422). These SEZ, which were also established in 
Guangdong province, brought several benefits to the coastal counties of Fujian, among which 
enormous amounts of investments from overseas descendants of Fujian natives (Vogel, 2013, 
p. 403). 
 
Mechanism 3: inefficiency of SOEs and inability to adapt to the new market economy 
In all three provinces, the development of counties with a large share of SOEs has 
been hampered by the inefficiency of those SOEs and their inability to adapt to the new 
market economy. Due largely to their rigid institutional structure, ageing equipment and 
lagging technological innovation, they have been no match for the vibrant private enterprises 
in a relatively open market economy (Wei, Yu & Chen, 2010, p. 417). Furthermore, non-state 
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enterprises enjoyed much more autonomy than SOEs, so they could offer much higher 
salaries and hence attract many highly educated and skilful workers (Long & Ng, 2001, p. 
218). In Jiangsu, the average utilization ratio of capacity of a lot of state industries is very low, 
with for example the automobile industry having a percentage of less than 50 (Perotti, Sun & 
Zou, 1999, p. 157), while the exceptional growth of for example TVEs helped improve the 
living standards of peasants, and enhanced local revenues (Long & Ng, 2001, p. 227).  In 
Zhejiang counties with a large share of SOEs have been troubled by the inefficiency of these 
usually heavy industries (Yue et al., 2014, p. 5773), while in contrast counties with a lot of 
private enterprises have been very successful, not in the last place because the implementation 
of reforms proceeded very smoothly in a marketized environment (Ye & Wei, 2005, p. 357). 
The statistics in Fujian are illuminating in this regard: in 1990, the labour productivity of 
SOEs in yuan per person was 17,844, while that of non-state enterprises was 51,318 (Ash & 
Qi, 1996, pp. 134-135). 
 
 Alternative explanations 
 
 Several other variables, besides the institutional one, are mentioned in the literature as 
being one of the most important causes of inter-county inequality in China: 
- Proximity to large cities: some authors (e.g. Wei & Kim, 2000) conclude that, based 
on the case of Jiangsu, proximity to large cities (in this case Shanghai) is associated 
with higher growth rates for counties. However, when looking at the cases of Zhejiang 
and Fujian, this relationship is not existing. In Zhejiang, counties in the Northern 
region of Jiaxing belong to the slowest-growing counties, while Jiaxing is the region 
located closest to Shanghai. The growth rates of counties in Jiaxing show that the 
relationship between proximity to large cities and economic growth rates is 
conditional: it is only positive if a county has a low share of SOEs. If a county has a 
large share of SOEs (as is the case with counties in Jiaxing), proximity to large cities 
does not have a positive effect on GDP per capita growth, a conclusion also drawn by 
Wei & Ye (2004, p. 56). The same is visible in Fujian, where proximity to large cities 
is not associated with high levels of economic growth, as some of the slowest-growing 
and poorest counties are located near the prosperous large city of Xiamen (Lyons, 
1998, p. 406). An explanation for the fact that in the case of Jiangsu there is a positive 
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relationship between proximity to large cities and economic growth, is that the 
counties located closest to Shanghai, are also the counties where the non-state sector is 
the most developed, and the share of SOEs the lowest.  
 
- Initial level of economic development and infrastructure: Again, from the case of 
Jiangsu one might conclude that initial level of economic and infrastructural 
development influences the economic growth rates of counties, as counties in the 
prosperous region of Sunan have traditionally been more developed than their 
counterparts in Subei and Suzhong. However, this relationship is not visible in both 
Zhejiang and Fujian, as the counties that did best during the reform period were 
usually among the poorest at the start of reforms in 1978. In Zhejiang, the traditional 
northeast-southwest divide has given way to a coastal-interior divide (Wei & Ye, 2004, 
p. 58), while in Fujian initial level of development is not at all associated with 
economic growth rates during the reform period (Lyons, 1998, p. 416), as several 
counties in the traditional rich interior part of the province belong now to the poorest 
of China. Furthermore, some authors have suggested that backward infrastructure is 
one of the reasons some counties have had low growth rates (e.g. Wei & Ye, 2004, p. 
54), but counties in the region of Wenzhou in Zhejiang belong to the fastest-growing 
of the province, while the infrastructure availability and quality of Wenzhou is among 
the worst of the province (Liu, 1992; Foster, 1998, p. 136).    
 
- Fiscal decentralization measures: Undoubtedly, measures of fiscal decentralization 
have amplified inequality between counties, because these measures tended to 
concentrate more and more resources in localities where non-state enterprises 
flourished (Long & Ng, 2001, p. 219). However, it is not really an independent 
variable, but rather an explanation for the fact why distribution between counties has 
not taken place and why the positive influences of state and foreign investment in 
certain counties have not spilled over to other counties in the province. Long & Ng 
(2001) argue that fiscal decentralization measures have worsened (not caused) 
intraprovincial inequality, because the weak legal framework caused an almost 
complete absence of redistribution between counties, a conclusion that is also drawn 
by Kanbur & Zhang (2005). In Jiangsu, new fiscal contract systems implemented in 
the late 1970s and 1980s gave local governments more (fiscal) autonomy (Wei & Fan, 
2000, p. 460), which, in combination with the absence of a legal framework as 
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described by Long & Ng (2001), resulted in the benefits of FDI and state investment 
not being redistributed throughout the province, but being used only for the particular 
county.            
 
Conclusion 
 
As noted before, although according to various authors intraprovincial inequality 
constitutes the crux of the problem of regional inequality in China (Cheong & Wu, 2012; 
Hussain, Lanjouw & Stern, 1994; Akita, 2003), most literature about economic inequality in 
China has been focussed on the causes of interprovincial inequality. I have tried in this thesis, 
by analysing inter-county inequality during the period of economic reforms in the three 
coastal provinces of Jiangsu, Zhejiang and Fujian, to narrow the gap in the literature by 
shedding more light on the causes of intraprovincial inequality. After reviewing the literature 
and conducting the analysis, the research question this thesis started with (why have counties 
in the Chinese coastal provinces experienced such remarkably different levels of economic 
growth during the period of economic reforms), can now be answered more satisfactory. 
Counties which had a large share of SOEs in total fixed asset investments tended to lag 
behind in per capita GDP growth compared to counties with a large share of non-state 
enterprises. The explanation for this finding is threefold: SOEs were less efficient and less 
able to the new market economy than were non-state enterprises, counties with a large share 
of non-state enterprises received more FDI, and counties with a large share of non-state 
enterprises received preferential policies from the central government. As mentioned, these 
explanations are consistent with literature about transition economies in general. The fact that 
China has been more successful than a lot of other countries in transition may be contributed 
to the fact that China’s regime is authoritarian and had therefore more leeway to implement 
drastic reforms.           
 Although several authors have mentioned the SOE-factor as the most important cause 
of inter-county inequality during the reform period in China, a significant number of works 
has found other variables (e.g. proximity to large cities, measures of fiscal decentralization, 
infrastructure, initial level of development) to be just as significant as the SOE-variable. The 
reason why the authors of these works have come to a different conclusion than the one made 
in this paper can possibly contributed to the fact that most of these works deal with a single 
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province, while this thesis compares three provinces, which results in several insights that 
may not have been gained from studying a single case. For example, while several authors in 
the case of Jiangsu argued that proximity to large cities positively influenced the per capita 
GDP growth of counties (e.g. Wei & Kim, 2002), the cases of Zhejiang and Fujian proved 
that proximity to large cities was only positively related to economic growth of a county if 
that county had a large share of non-state enterprises. Furthermore, while one might conclude 
from the case of Jiangsu that the growth rates of counties were influenced by the traditional 
divide between poor and rich, the case of Fujian, where the traditional divide has been 
reversed, shows that initial level of development did not influence economic growth rates of 
counties.           
 However, although this thesis has shown the significance of the institutional variable 
in explaining diverging growth rates of counties, it is important to acknowledge its limitations. 
Considering the fact that the institutional variable is significant not only to explain diverging 
growth rates of counties in provinces within the coastal zone, but also in diverging growth 
rates between provinces (Naughton, 1988), it is plausible to assume its significance in 
explaining intraprovincial inequality in other zones as well. However, as mentioned, the 
Central and Western provinces suffer from a lack reliable data. When more reliable data about 
the county-level is released, case studies on some of the interior provinces might be conducted 
to investigate the significance of the institutional variable in explaining intraprovincial 
inequality in the Central and Western zone. Further research might also focus on the weight of 
the individual mechanisms (inefficiency and inability of SOEs to adapt to market economy, 
reception of FDI and preferential policies of the central government) that have caused 
counties with a large share of SOEs to grow more slowly than counties with a large share of 
non-state enterprises. 
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